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Abstract
Melody Wirz is a third year law student at The University of Oklahoma College of Law. She is a
registered patent agent and has received a B.S. from Oklahoma State University as well as an
M.B.A. from Oklahoma City University. Ms. Wirz addresses current legislative loopholes
concerning patents on pharmaceutical drugs as well as the effect legal monopolies have on
generic drug entry into the marketplace. She would also like to extend her gratitude and
thankfulness to her husband, Trey Wirz. Without his support, her success, both at law school
and in life, would not be possible.
ARE PATENTS REALLY LIMITED TO 20 YEARS?—A CLOSER LOOK AT
PHARMACEUTICALS
Melody Wirz
I.

Introduction

As discussed in Part I, a patent is usually granted for twenty years. However, a special
circumstance exists in the case of pharmaceutical companies. Such companies are granted
special patent protections because of the cost of research, development, and clinical trials, and
because FDA approval takes considerable time to process. This issue is further addressed in Part
II. The current law which governs the ability to extend drug patent protection is embodied in the
Hatch-Waxman Act, as discussed in Part III. Unfortunately, the Act has a number of loopholes
that drug companies can manipulate to their advantage. Part IV explores the number of tactics
used in the manipulation of patent terms, which includes extending patents through legislative
loopholes and lobbying, initiating litigation alleging patent infringement, layering of patents and
the combination of drugs to create new patents, as well as advertising and developing brand
names to increase barriers for generic entry into the pharmaceutical market. Part V of this article
addresses the recent legislation on this issue.
II.

Patent Terms

In today’s patent system, patents grant a legal monopoly on an invention for twenty
years, which begins on the date the patent application is filed with The United States Patent and
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Trademark Office. A three-year extension changed the law prior to 1995; the law prior to 1995
initially granted a period of exclusivity for only seventeen years from the time a patent had been
granted. 1 This change in the law was promulgated through The Uruguay Round Agreement Act
as a piece on The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Essentially, it synchronized U.S.
patent terms with other nations. 2 The different durations for patent protection are still notable as
patents that are currently due to expire were extended under the old rule. While the date of the
patent dictates the length of patent protection, the patent term is the same for most inventions,
including new drugs. 3
III.

FDA Approval

Any new drug must go through an extensive governmental approval process before it can
be marketed to the public. The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) may take many years to
approve a new pharmaceutical. Accordingly, drug companies are granted the right to apply for a
patent extension for up to five years so that they can have a maximum effective patent life of
fourteen years. 4 However, since clinical trials and FDA approval takes about eight and a half
years to complete, the viable patent term may be even shorter than the fourteen years specified. 5
Therefore, pharmaceutical companies have a fairly short monopoly time to recover the extensive
research and development costs associated with developing a new drug. The Hatch-Waxman
Act of 1984 6 further limits developers of new drugs, as discussed below in Part III.
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IV.

Hatch-Waxman Act

The current law in the area of patents is The Hatch-Waxman Act, which proposes to
balance the competing interests of brand name companies, generic companies, insurance
companies, and the public by promoting competition and decreasing drug costs. 7 The Act has
two provisions of great interest in the dispute between brand name companies and other
interested parties. The first is the automatic 30-month stay granted to the patent holder when the
patent holder brings an infringement suit against a new generic manufacturer. This stay prevents
the approval of a generic version of the name brand drug regardless of whether the original
patent has expired. The second provision of interest allows a 180-day period of exclusivity
granted to the first generic company to enter the market after the patent expires. 8 In both
instances, brand name manufacturers are able to manipulate the Act in order to extend the life of
their patent. The methods for doing so are discussed below.
V.

Patent Extension Tactics

There are at least four ways brand name drug companies effectively extend the life of
their patents. 9 These include the following: (1) extending patents through legislative loopholes
and lobbying; (2) initiating litigation alleging patent infringement; (3) layering of patents and the
combination of drugs to create new patents; and (4) advertising and developing brand names to
increase barriers for generic entry. 10
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A.

Extending Patents Through Legislative Loopholes and Lobbying
One of the most utilized ways to extend the patent life for profitable drugs is through the

use of The Hatch-Waxman Act. 11

The Act was passed to give generic drugs a greater

opportunity to benefit consumers and insurance companies. However, The Hatch-Waxman Act
has many loopholes. 12 One of the ways companies continue patent protection is by applying for
new patents for the existing drug during the protection period. 13 An example of this would be
tying the drug to another use than what was originally applied for, or by filing for patent
protection for some of the unique properties of the drug, such as a purified form. 14 Patents may
also be extended through litigation. 15 Hatch-Waxman allows for an automatic 30-month stay
when infringement is alleged. 16 This is discussed further in Section B.
Another tool used by drug companies stems from The Uruguay Round Agreement. 17 If
companies begin testing for pediatric use, they get an automatic 6-month extension on their
patent. 18 Thus, by combining the pediatric extension with the 30-month stay and the possibility
of a new patent granted on the same drug for one of the “new” properties of the drug or for a
change in the drug’s use, drug companies may extend their exclusivity by at least three years.
Patent protection is meant to reward innovation and research. Skillful lawyering or lobbying
should not be rewarded as much as true innovation. However, the loopholes further a policy that
does little to spur new innovation, which ultimately is the fundamental basis for patent
protection.
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B.

Initiating Litigation Alleging Patent Infringement
Brand name drug companies continue to abuse the two major provisions of The Hatch-

Waxman Act. 19 By initiating litigation, whether legitimate or not, pharmaceutical companies are
able to keep generics out of the market for at least thirty months after the original patent
expires. 20 Generic manufacturers are not allowed to enter the market while a dispute is ongoing,
which results in larger profits for the brand name manufacturer.21 Sometimes, the brand name
drug manufacturer is able to get multiple stays resulting in even more years of an extended
monopoly term. 22

For example, GlaxcoSmith-Kline was able to get five patent extensions

totaling sixty-five months for Paxil.23 In the meantime, the company netted more than $1 billion
on the drug in just one year of the stay. 24
Additionally, major pharmaceutical companies manipulate The Hatch-Waxman Act by
colluding with the first generic to market. 25

Often, the generic drug company enters an

agreement not to compete with the brand name drug. 26 While this appears to be a legitimate
result of litigation surrounding a patent, the scenario is somewhat backward. The generic party
will retain the 180-day exclusivity period and opt out of using it in exchange for a settlement
sum. 27 Typically, settlement funds flow from the alleged infringer to the patent holder, not the
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other way around. 28 Basically, this practice amounts to the brand name manufacturer paying the
generic manufacturer not to compete for the 180-day period of exclusivity. The policy indicated
by this loophole is problematic and certainly needs updating.
C.

Layering of Patents and the Combination of Drugs to Create New Patents
Often, drug companies facing the expiration of a patent will develop a new use or

different version of their old drug. 29 This practice is referred to as layering. Eli Lilly’s Prozac
demonstrates one example of a drug company obtaining a new patent on an additional aspect of
an old drug. 30 When faced with the patent expiration of the popular antidepressant drug, Eli
Lilly developed a weekly version of the drug. 31 By advertising this new feature to the public, the
drug company basically killed the demand for the old product along with any likely generic
imitation.
Drug companies also avoid losing monopoly rights due to patent expiration by combining
two different drugs and patenting the combination. 32 The combination often consists of one drug
to treat a medical condition and a secondary drug to alleviate a side effect of the primary drug. 33
While this does improve the drug, it is not new innovation. However, patent protection is
frequently granted for these pharmaceutical combinations. Again, the drug company can use
advertising to essentially eliminate demand for the old product, as well as any comparable
generic substitute. Of course, public awareness of the improved drug is necessary if the generic
is to be disregarded as a viable option.
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In the past, a manufacturer would claim a new patent for the drug based on an
unapproved use to treat a medical condition. 34 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit made a ruling in January, 2003, that may change this practice. 35 For further
details on this ruling, see Warner-Lambert Co. v. APOTEX Corp. 36
D.

Advertising and Developing Brand Names to Increase Barriers For Generic Entry
There is no question that advertising is an effective vehicle for increasing sales. Since the

1997 relaxation of direct consumer advertising by the FDA, drug companies have increasingly
utilized this strategy to gain and retain customers. 37 One source estimates that drug companies
spent $2.5 billion on consumer advertising in 2000. 38 The same source also estimated that these
ads might have brought in as much as $5 to $6 in return for each dollar spent on
advertisements. 39 While drug companies do not openly disclose marketing expenditures, the
amount is estimated to be much more than what is allocated to research and development. 40
While drug companies argue that patent term extensions are necessary to justify large research
and development costs, this reasoning falls short when the major cost in new drugs is
advertising, rather than research and development.
V.

New Legislation

In the middle part of 2002, a new bill was proposed.

The Greater Access to

Pharmaceuticals Bill, also known as The McCain-Schumer Bill, sought to reform the earlier
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Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. 41 The bill proposed two relevant changes to the Hatch-Waxman
rule. First, McCain-Schumer sought to change the structure of the 30-month stay. 42 Rather than
being automatic, the new bill proposed to require judicial review for the stay to occur. 43 Second,
the bill attempted to establish a “use it or lose it” standard for the 180-day period of exclusivity
given to the first generic manufacturer. 44 Under this rule, if a generic challenger fails to launch
its product within a specified time, the second generic manufacturer would inherit the exclusive
right. 45 This would eliminate any incentive for the pioneer drug manufacturer to keep the first
generic manufacturer out of the market by settling an infringement suit. 46
The Senate approved The McCain-Schumer Bill on July 31, 2002 47 by a margin of 7821. 48 However, industry blocked passage in the House. 49 Thus, the legislation is not likely to be
re-considered this year 50 or in the current Congress. 51
VI.

Conclusion

Pharmaceutical companies use a number of tactics to extend the effective life of
patents. While these companies argue that a longer life is necessary to justify the substantial
research and development costs involved in producing a new drug, the practices are nonetheless
suspect. The legislation that would have eliminated these practices passed the Senate by a large
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margin and demonstrates that this is an issue of concern to the public. However, the industry
was able to block the legislation from coming to a vote in the House. Additionally, the new
makeup of the House indicates that it is unlikely that this issue will be addressed any time soon.
This is unfortunate. If legislation comparable to The McCain-Schumer Bill were to pass, it
would certainly benefit consumers through greater generic availability, rather than permitting
large pharmaceuticals to continuously prey on generic drug companies by using questionable
legal tactics.
The Bush administration plans to take considerable steps to shorten the time it will take a
generic drug to enter the pharmaceutical market. This plan, announced on January 24, 2003,
includes increased FDA funding so that the amount of time it takes the FDA to approve a generic
drug will be reduced by approximately two months. This will shave considerable time off the
average 21.5 months it took the FDA to process an application for generic drug entry in the year
2002. This plan will be incorporated into the Bush administration budget proposal for the Fiscal
Year of 2004 and calls for a thirteen million dollar increase in funding to the FDA. 51 Thus, Bush
plans to press for the reduction of time that the generic review process will take. However, this
push will take the form of FDA backing instead of legislative reform.
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